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1. The appointment of Anatoli Y. Lavrentyev as Soviet Ambassador to Rumania is directly connected with the current purge of the Communist Party of Rumania. The Soviet ambassador he replaced had demonstrated his inability to cope with the political and economic problems in Rumania, and, in addition to this, had compromised himself to a certain extent by his close personal contact with Ana Pauker and her companions. For this reason he was recalled, not merely transferred to a new post. It will be his task to justify his activities in Rumania, which from Moscow's standpoint were not very successful.
2. The appointment of Lavrentyev, who served in Prague but half a year, attests to the gravity of the situation which has developed in Rumania. Lavrentyev is a man with a strong hand who, as Second Deputy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is considered an expert on the people's democracies. His previous activities in Yugoslavia, where he attempted Tito's liquidation, and in Czechoslovakia, where, during his stay, Rudolf Slansky and his associates were liquidated, are indicative of the impending purge within the Communist Party of Rumania. Lavrentyev apparently goes to Rumania with the assignment to create order at any cost, and as quickly as possible. His conspicuously rapid recall from Prague attests to this.
3. Of the four deputies in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs only Valerian A. Zorin remains in Moscow: Andrei A. Gromyko is in London, Lavrentyev in Bucharest, and Aleksandr Y. Bogomolov in Prague. The appointment of Bogomolov as Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia indicates that Moscow still attaches great importance to Czechoslovakia's political and economic development. Were the situation in Czechoslovakia progressing according to Soviet intentions it would not be necessary to appoint as ambassador another deputy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bogomolov's appointment is surprising to a certain extent because both he and

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Gromyko were responsible for relations with Western nations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas Lavrentyev and Zorin were responsible for relations with the people's democracies. From the appointment of Gromyko to London, together with the other diplomatic changes, it is possible to conclude that Moscow is prepared to make certain changes of policy toward the Western European states in an attempt to isolate the United States politically. In all probability the main targets of this attempt will be the Western European Social Democratic parties in which the tendency to arrive at an understanding with the USSR is most developed.

4. It is possible that Czechoslovakia will be assigned a role in this over-all political effort, since of all the satellite countries Czechoslovakia still has most contact with the West. It would be Bogomolov's task to guide Czechoslovakia in this role. Czechoslovakia's task would consist of sounding out and laying the groundwork for the Soviet Union in those countries which still regard Czechoslovakia in a sympathetic light as a result of past association. The possibility cannot be discounted that some former Social Democrats, such as Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Zdenek Fierlinger and others, who have friends in various Western European Social Democratic parties, might be called upon to participate in such an attempt.
5. In the realm of Czech domestic politics, it is probable that Bogomolov's task is to settle in a "suitable" manner the conflict between President Klement Gottwald and Premier Antonin Zapotocky, and to make changes in Czechoslovak industry, since production is falling both in quantity and quality. Production problems will not, however, constitute his primary task since Bogomolov is, first of all, a politician and not an economist. It seems that Bogomolov, in attempting to settle the differences between Gottwald and Zapotocky, may use conciliatory tactics, and not adopt a strong policy as Lavrentyev might do if faced with a similar situation. Although the Soviet Union is interested in maintaining order and quiet in Czechoslovakia, it is possible that the pursuit of this goal will not necessitate at this time the use of such forcible measures as will be used, for example, in Rumania. This is, however, dependent upon the extent to which it is possible to establish political tranquility within Czechoslovakia without the use of force.
6. The Soviet attitude toward Czechoslovakia stems from Soviet recognition of the great importance of Czechoslovakia in its political plans. The appointment of Bogomolov as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia is an indication of this recognition, otherwise the appointment could have been given a man of less importance than the Third Deputy of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
7. One incident which appears to bear out the above thesis is the letter addressed by the Czechoslovak Parliament to the parliaments of the Western European nations advocating a relaxing of international tension. It is very interesting to note that this letter in no way attacks the Western European governments: the attack is concentrated on the United States.

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